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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
WILLIAMS V. STATE: A CONFESSION IS VOLUNTARY
UNLESS THE DEFENDANT UNAMBIGUOUSLY INVOKES
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT OR THE
CONFESSION IS OBTAINED THROUGH COERCION OR
INDUCEMENT.
By: Pascale Cadelien
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that “I don’t want to say nothing.
I don’t know,” is an ambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent.
Williams v. State, 445 Md. 452, 455, 128 A.3d 30, 32 (2015). The court
reasoned that the defendant’s addition of “I don’t know” to his initial assertion
“I don’t want to say nothing” created uncertainty about whether he intended
to invoke his right to remain silent. Id. at 477, A.3d at 44. This allowed a
reasonable officer to interpret his statement as an “ambiguous request to
remain silent.” Id. Furthermore, the officers’ implication that the defendant
should confess to a “robbery gone bad,” instead of premeditated murder, did
not induce his confession. Id. at 477-483, A.3d at 45-48. Accordingly, the
defendant’s confession was voluntary. Id. at 483, A.3d at 48.
On January 10, 2011, Justin DeSha-Overcash was shot and killed in
College Park, Maryland. Detective Harris and Sergeant McDonald, from the
Prince George’s County Police Department, interrogated Deandre Ricardo
Williams (“Williams”) in connection with the shooting.
Williams
continuously denied having knowledge of the incident. Nevertheless, the
officers made several attempts to read Williams his rights and to inform him
that he was not obligated to talk. Williams eventually stated, “I don’t want to
say nothing. I don’t know.” Sergeant McDonald interrupted him by
responding, “But you don’t have to say nothing.”
Then, one of the officers read Williams the entirety of his rights and gave
him a copy, which Williams read and signed. Thereafter, Detective Harris
described two possible charges, one of premeditated murder and the other of
a “robbery gone bad.” Detective Harris mentioned that Williams “may never
see outside again” if convicted of premeditation. Williams responded, “No
matter what you all find out, they’re going to smoke my boots anyway.”
Williams then confessed.
Williams was indicted in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County for
first-degree murder, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of
violence, and several other related offenses. Before trial, Williams filed a
motion to suppress his confession. He argued: (1) he invoked his right to
remain silent when he expressed, “I don’t want to say nothing. I don’t know”
and (2) his confession was involuntary because it was coerced.
The trial court denied Williams’s motion to suppress, finding that
Williams’s invocation of his right to remain silent was “ambiguous and
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equivocal.” The circuit court also found that Williams’s confession was
voluntary. Williams was subsequently convicted of first-degree murder and
use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. He was sentenced
to life in prison, with all but 49 years suspended and a concurrent 20 years,
respectively.
Williams appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which
affirmed both trial court holdings. Williams then petitioned the Court of
Appeals of Maryland for writ of certiorari, which the court granted. The court
was tasked with determining the ambiguity of Williams’s invocation of his
right to silence and the voluntariness of Williams’s confession.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by discussing the right
to remain silent articulated in Miranda v. Arizona. Williams, 445 Md. at 469,
128 A.3d at 40 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). The court
explained that pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, a detainee must be advised
by law enforcement, prior to questioning, of his rights to remain silent and to
have an attorney present. Williams, 445 Md. at 469-70, 128 A.3d at 40 (citing
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479).
The court then explained that for an individual to properly invoke his
Miranda rights, the individual must do so “unambiguously.” Williams, 445
Md. at 470, 128 A.3d at 40 (citing Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. 452 (1994)). When
the invocation is clear, the constitutional mandates attach and the officer is
directed by the law on how to proceed. Id. at 470, 128 A.3d at 40 (citing Davis,
512 U.S. at 458-59). Otherwise, the officer is not constitutionally required to
terminate the interrogation or to seek clarification from the individual. Id. at
470, 128 A.3d at 40 (citing Davis, 512 U.S. at 458-59).
The court remarked that although the case sub judice presented an issue of
first impression, it had applied the Davis test in the context of the right to
counsel. Williams, 445 Md. at 471, 128 A.3d at 41, (citing Ballard v. State,
420 Md. 480, 24 A.3d 96 (2011)). In that case, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that “you mind if …” is a “colloquial []” term used to assert,
rather than request, a right to an attorney. Id., (quoting Ballard, 420 Md. at
485, 24 A.3d at 99).
The Court of Appeals of Maryland also looked to sister courts for examples
of ambiguous and unambiguous invocations of the right to remain silent.
Williams, 445 Md. at 471-75, 128 A.3d at 41-43. The court determined that
the common thread among the persuasive cases was the certainty of the
invocations. Id. at 475, 128 A.3d at 43. The objective inquiry asks whether a
reasonable police officer, under the circumstances, would perceive the
individual to be invoking his right to remain silent. Id.
Applying the standard to Williams’s statement, the court of appeals agreed
with the lower courts that the addition of “I don’t know” to Williams’s
statement converted an otherwise clear assertion of his right to remain silent
into an “ambiguous and equivocal” invocation. Williams, 445 Md. at 475-77,
128 A.3d at 43-44. Accordingly, a reasonable officer could have interpreted
Williams’s statement as his contemplation of whether or not he should remain
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silent; therefore, the court rejected Williams’s argument. Id. at 477, 128 A.3d
at 44.
The court then held that Williams’s confession was voluntary. Williams,
445 Md. at 483, 128 A.3d at 48. Maryland criminal law provides that any
confession by an accused from an officer’s inducement, either expressed or
implied, is involuntary and inadmissible. Id. at 478, 128 A.3d at 45 (citing
Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 153, 406 A.2d 415, 420 (1979)). To determine
involuntariness, the court applies a two-prong test that examines: 1) whether
there was a threat or promise by the officer, and if so 2) whether there was a
nexus between the threat or promise and the confession. Id., (citing State v.
Tolbert, 381 Md. 539, 588, 850 A.2d 1192, 1203 (2004)).
The first prong of the involuntariness test uses a reasonable person
standard, ignoring the accused’s subjective belief. Williams, 445 Md. at 47879, 128 A.3d at 45 (citing Hillard, 286 Md. 145, 406 A.2d 415). If prong one
is satisfied, the court must determine whether the accused confessed in reliance
on the inducement. Id. at 478, 128 A.3d at 45 (citing Hillard, 286 Md. 145,
406 A.2d 415). Applying this test, the court of appeals explained that the
officers did not induce Williams’s statement by offering two conviction
scenarios. Id. at 481, 128 A.3d at 47. Instead, the officers were advising
Williams of the potential legal consequences that he might be facing when
they illustrated premeditated murder and a “robbery gone bad.” Id. Even if
the officers did induce Williams, his statement that “they’re going to smoke
my boots anyway” illustrated his understanding of the situation’s severity and
a lack of reliance on the officer’s statements. Id.
In Williams, the Court of Appeals of Maryland determined that “I don’t
know” converted Williams’s unambiguous invocation of “I don’t want to say
nothing” into an ambiguous invocation. The court also found that there was
no inducement to render Williams’s confession involuntary. The court’s
decision to adhere to the objective test of unambiguity guides officers and
creates consistency. However, this decision may permit officers to take
advantage of criminal defendants who are less familiar with their Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent.

